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Economics, Behavioral Biology, and Law
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This article compares the relevance to law of two unexpect-
edly similar fields: economics and behavioral biology. It first
examines the assumptions, core concepts, methodological
tenets, and emphases of the two fields. It then compares the
interdisciplinary fields of law and economics, on one hand,
with law and behavioral biology, on the other-highlighting
not only important similarities but also important differ-
ences. The article subsequently explores ways that biological
perspectives on human behavior may, among other things,
improve economic models and the behavioral insights they
generate. The article concludes that although there are
important differences between the two fields, the overlaps
between economics and biology warrant even greater con-
gress between these two disciplines, and expanded exchange
between the legal thinkers interested in each of them.
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I. INTRODUCTION
With the decline of law as an autonomous disciplineI legal scholars
have long sought ways to improve law by integrating insights from
other fields. For the most part, these efforts have mined the social
sciences, such as sociology, political science, and traditional psychol-
ogy. More recently, however, scholars have turned to the natural sci-
ences, including behavioral biology and neuroscience, in an effort to
learn more about the multiple causal influences on human behaviors
relevant to law.
Because law and economics is arguably the most successful of
the "law and" intersections, it is inevitable that other interdisci-
plinary efforts will be compared to it. For example, several years ago
John Monahan posed the question, in an article by this title, "Could
"Law and Evolution" be the Next "Law and Economics"? 2 We
think the question warrants an extended examination and explicit
answer.3 Each of us has worked for some years at the intersection
of law and biology,4 at the intersection of law and economics,' or
IRichard A. Posner, The Decline of Law as an Autonomous Discipline: 1962-1987,
100 Harv L Rev 761 (1987).
John Monahan, Could "Law and Evolution " be the Next "Law and Economics "?,
8 Va J Soc Pol'y & L 123 (2000).
3 For a recent article exploring some of the "deeply resonant" thinking between law
and biology and law and economics, see Morris B. Hoffman, Law and Biology, 8 J Phil,
Sci & L (2008). For additional discussion of Monahan's article, see David 1. Herring,
Legal Scholarship, Humility, and the Scientific Method, 25 Q L Rev 867 (2007).
4 See, for example, Owen D. Jones & Timothy H. Goldsmith, Law and Behavioral
Biology, 104 Colum L Rev 405 (2005); Paul Robinson, Robert Kurzban & Owen D.
Jones, The Origins of Shared Intuitions of Justice, 60 Vanderbilt L Rev 1633 (2007);
Erin Ann O'Hara, How Neuroscience Might Advance the Law, 359 Phil Trans R Soc
Lond B 1677 (2004), reprinted as chapter 2 in Semir Zeki and Oliver Goodenough, eds,
Law & the Brain 21 (Oxford 2006); Erin Ann O'Hara, Brain Plasticity and Spanish
Moss in Biolegal Analysis, 53 Fla L Rev 905 (2001); Jeffrey Evans Stake, The Property
'Instinct', 359 Phil Trans R Soc Lond B 1763 (2004), reprinted as chapter 10 in Law &
the Brain 185; Jeffrey Evans Stake, Pushing Evolutionary Analysis of Law, 53 Fla L
Rev 875 (2001).
Of course, we are not alone in this. Many have made, and continue to make, sig-
nificant contributions to each of these fields. Jones maintains a bibliography of many
scholarly works at the intersection of Law and Biology on the website of The Society
for Evolutionary Analysis in Law (SEAL), online at http://www.sealsite.org.
5 See, for example, Erin Ann O'Hara, The Economics of Conflict of Laws (2 volume
edited work, Edward Elgar 2007); Erin Ann O'Hara, Economics, Public Choice, and
the Perennial Conflict of Laws, 90 Geo L J 941 (2002); Erin Ann O'Hara & Larry E. Rib-
stein, From Politics to Efficiency in Choice of Law, 67 U Chi L Rev 1151 (2000); Wil-
liam H. Allen & Erin A. O'Hara, Second Generation Law and Economics of Conflict of
Laws: Baxter's Comparative Impairment and Beyond, 51 Stan L Rev 1011 (1999); Erin
Ann O'Hara & Larry E. Ribstein, Choice of Law/Conflict of Laws, in Gerritt de Geest,
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both.6 Perhaps unsurprisingly, we see similarities and differences in
the two fields that suggest that the answer to Monahan's question
is: in some ways yes, and in some ways no.
We structure our approach as follows. Part II provides background
information useful to the discussion in the remainder of the article.
Part HI compares microeconomics7 and biology generally. Part
IV then compares law and economics, on one hand, with law and
behavioral biology,' on the other. These latter two Parts very briefly
compare the assumptions, core concepts, methodological tenets,
ed, Ghent Encyclopedia of Law and Economics (Edward Elgar 2000); Erin Ann O'Hara
& Francesco Parisi, Conflict of Laws, in The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics
and the Law 387-96 (Macmillan 1998); Ein Ann O'Hara & William Dougan, Redis-
tribution Through Discriminatory Taxes: A Contractarian Explanation of the Role of
the Courts, 6 Geo Mason L Rev 869 (1998); Erin Ann O'Hara & Richard S. Murphy,
Mistake of Federal Criminal Law: A Study of Coalitions and Costly Information, 5 S
Ct Econ Rev 217 (1997); Erin Ann O'Hara, Social Constraint or Implicit Collusion?:
Toward A Game Theoretic Analysis of Stare Decisis, 24 Seton Hall L Rev 736 (1993);
Jeffrey E. Stake, Inheritance Law and Land Use Doctrines, 2 Peter Newman, ed, The
New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics and the Law 311-21, 437-46 (Macmillan
1998); Jeffrey Evans Stake, The Uneasy Case for Adverse Possession, 89 Geo L J 2419
(2001). In addition, Stake co-founded the Midwest Law and Economics Association
with Thomas Ulen and Kenneth Dau-Schmidt.
6 Owen D. Jones, Time-Shifted Rationality and the Lawof Law's Leverage: Behav-
ioral Economics Meets Behavioral Biology, 95 NW U L Rev 1141 (2001); Owen D.
Jones & Sarah F. Brosnan, Law, Biology, and Property: A New Theory of the Endow-
ment Effect, 49 Wm & Mary L Rev 1935 (2008); Erin Ann O'Hara & Douglas Yarn, On
Apology and Consilience, 77 Wash L Rev 1121 (2002); Jeffrey Evans Stake, Darwin,
Donations, and the Illusion of Dead Hand Control, 64 Tulane L Rev 705-81 (1990);
Jeffrey Evans Stake, Evolution of Rules in a Common Law System: Differential Liti-
gation of the Fee Tail and Other Perpetuities, chapter 17 in Paul H. Rubin, ed, The
Evolution of Efficient Common Law(Edward Elgar 2007), volume 3 in series Economic
Approaches to Law (Richard A. Posner and Francesco Parisi, eds). In addition, each of
us is a founding officer of the Society for Evolutionary Analysis in Law-the website
is available online at http://www.sealsite.org.
I The economics used to enrich legal studies has been almost entirely limited to
microeconomics. Because the movement is called "law and economics" and because
"economics" is more compact than "microeconomics", we shall use the term "eco-
nomics" even though "microeconomics" would be more accurate.
I Alternatively referred to as "law and biology" (see, for example, programs of the
Gruter Institute for Law and Behavioral Research), "evolutionary analysis in law"
(see, for example, Owen D. Jones, Evolutionary Analysis in Law: An Introduction and
Application to Child Abuse, 75 NC L Rev 1117 (1997) and "law and evolution" (see,
for example, Monahan (cited in note 2)). A further note on terminology: Behavioral
biology comprises a wide variety of subdisciplines. Unless otherwise noted, the term
as used here will refer to behavioral biology applied to the human context, which has
overlaps with evolutionary psychology, evolutionary anthropology, behavioral ecol-
ogy, sociobiology, Darwinian medicine, behavioral genetics, and the like. We exclude,
from this discussion, several other important subfields of behavioral biology such as
psychopharmacology.
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and emphases of the fields of economics and behavioral biology, and
then explore the influences of these and other similarities and differ-
ences on the development of the applied fields of law and economics
and law and behavioral biology. Part V then further explores some
ways in which biological perspectives can provide useful insights
into human behavior by, among other things, improving economic
models and the behavioral insights they generate. Finally, it provides
advice to law and biology scholars seeking to avoid some of the criti-
cisms directed at law and economics.
Underlying our discussion below are two convictions. First, we
believe that a deeper, more accurate, and biologically informed
understanding of the relationships between biology, evolution, and
human behavior might help legal thinkers pursue policy goals more
efficiently and effectively than they do at present. Law makers need
sound models of when, why, and how people behave. And behavior
is-though the product of many influences-a biological phenom-
enon. It emerges in non-random ways from a corporeal brain that
is flexible, subtle, plastic, and often self-conscious, on one hand,
while being both anatomically and functionally specialized, on the
other. Second, just as with law and economics generally-and with
particular acknowledgment of the history of political mis-invocation
of biology-potentially useful insights must be carefully mined and
cautiously deployed.
II. CONTEXT
This Part does two things. It addresses why behavioral biology and
economics probably have more in common than do economics
and any of the other interdisciplinary subfields to which it is often
compared. And it provides a very brief overview of the relationship
between economics and behavioral biology. Together, these provide
background useful to the remainder of the article.
Biology and economics share, as a central concern, the effects of
resource scarcity on behavior.' Not surprisingly, then, the overlaps
and interactions between economics and biology are long-standing
9 The population of every species can increase indefinitely in number, unless
checked by some scarcity-of food, space, mates, or the like. See Mark Ridley, Evolu-
tion 63 (3d ed, Blackwell Scientific 1993). In animals, this creates selection pressures
that favor characteristics, including behavioral predispositions, that can aid survival
and reproduction in conditions of scarcity. See generally, John Alcock, Animal Behav-
ior: An Evolutionary Approach (8th ed., Sinauer Associates 2005). And economics has
been called "the study of the allocation of scarce means to satisfy competing ends."
Gary S. Becker, Economic Theory 1 (Knopf 1971).
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and extensive. Perhaps the most famous and explicit interaction,
however, was the influence of political economist Thomas Malthus
on biologist Charles Darwin.
Malthus' work pointed out that geometrically increasing popu-
lations could outgrow food supplies, leading to scarcity and famine. 0
Darwin read Malthus at a time (the year 1838, according to Darwin's
1876 autobiography") when he was keenly prepared to appreciate and
explore the consequences of this insight. And it helped provide the
tool he needed to identify, name, and describe "natural selection"' 2
as a major force in evolution. 3 Darwin realized that when population
growth can outstrip resources, and when more offspring are produced
than can survive to reproduce themselves, any heritable variations
in the traits of offspring that increase their chances of survival and
eventual reproduction (compared to the chances of their contempo-
raries) will tend to appear in increasingly large percentages in subse-
quent generations. This means that individuals within a species can,
over generations, come to look as if their traits were "designed" for
efficient operation within the ecological niches they inhabit.
Importantly, natural selection affects not only anatomical traits,
but associated behavioral predispositions (tracing to anatomical
traits of the nervous system) as well. From this perspective, animals
can be considered choice machines-since the best anatomy in the
world won't help if you don't deploy it in useful ways, at suitable
times. At any given moment, the choice to forage, flee, scratch,
10 Thomas Malthus, Essay on the Principle of Population (Printed for J. Johnson
1798).
"Appearing as Charles Darwin, Autobiography, in F. Darwin, ed, The Life and Let-
ters of Charles Darwin 68 ( Murray 1887), which contained the following passage:
In October 1838, that is, fifteen months after I had begun my systematic
enquiry, I happened to read for amusement 'Malthus on Population,' and being
well prepared to appreciate the struggle for existence which everywhere goes on
from long-continued observation of the habits of animals and plants, it at once
struck me that under these circumstances favourable variations would tend to
be preserved, and unfavourable ones to be destroyed. The results of this would
be the formation of new species. Here, then I had at last got a theory by which
to work....
Some trace the influence of economics on Darwin's work back even further, to encoun-
tering Adam Smith's work in the early 1830s. See, for example, Stephen Jay Gould, The
Structure of Evolutionary Theory 121-25 (Belknap 2002) (citing S.S. Schweber, The
Origin of the Origin Revisitied, 10 J History Bid 229 (1977)).
12 Natural selection describes the result of systems combining reproduction, heri-
table traits, variations in those traits; and differential reproduction as a function of
variation in heritable traits. See Ridley, at 63 (cited in note 12).
'3 Charles Darwin, The Origin of Species (Murray 1859).
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drink, fight, sleep, seek a mate, strengthen cooperative alliances,
or travel to another location may yield benefits, but at the cost of
both invested energy and foregone benefits from alternative activi-
ties. Those organisms predisposed (typically though not exclusively
through natural selection) to those behaviors (from among all pos-
sible behaviors) that increased the probabilities of survival and even-
tual reproduction more than do alternative behaviors "chosen" by
other members of the species left more offspring, many of which
would share these behavioral inclinations. Such inclinations are fre-
quently, of course, highly context-specific and condition-dependent.
That is, evolutionary processes can equip an organism with "if-then"
algorithms (often hierarchically ranked 14) such that: if encountering
environmental condition A, increase the probability of behaving in
way Y; but if encountering condition B, increase the probability of
behaving in way Z. And because the field of economics is largely
dedicated to the study of choice given particular costs and benefits,
biologists naturally gravitated toward economic tools.
Important intellectual insights have flowed in the other direc-
tion as well. For example, in 1898, the economist Thorstein Veblen
famously asked, in the title of an article, "Why is economics not an
evolutionary science?"" And by the 1920's, economist Alfred Lord
Marshall argued that "[economics] is a branch of biology broadly
interpreted."' 6
Within a few decades thereafter, economists Milton Friedman
and Armen Alchian had constructed powerful arguments for posi-
tive economic modeling of business behavior on the foundation of
Darwin's basic insight.' Friedman and Alchian invoked Darwinian
analysis (by analogy) to argue that businesses that make a profit will
survive in the market and those that do not will fail. When busi-
nesses fail, the labor and capital they employed are freed up for other
uses, of which some will turn out to be more productive and others
will, again, fail.
14 A good example of such hierarchical algorithms is the mating behavior of the
male scorpionfly, which has a preferred behavior, a backup behavior, and a backup-
backup behavior, which it switches among in sequence as circumstances change. See
Randy Thornhill, Rape in Panorpa Scorpionflies and a General Rape Hypothesis, 28
Animal Behav 52 (1980).
's Thorstein Veblen, Why Is Economics Not An Evolutionary Science?, Q J Econ
373(1898).
16 Alfred Lord Marshall, Principles of Economics Appdx C, 722 (Macmillan 1910,
6t ed.).
1" Milton Friedman, The Methodology of Positive Economics, in Milton Friedman,
ed, Essays in Positive Economics 35 (Chicago 1953); Armen A. Alchian, Uncertainty,
Evolution, and Economic Theory, 58 J Pol Econ 211 (1950).
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Thus, the market culls out unsuccessful businesses, those that
employ resources inefficiently, leaving those that make more of
resources. While the environment selects for business success, the
evolutionary process is very often facilitated by business managers
who consciously and unconsciously copy the operations of success-
ful businesses. The copies are often imperfect, both by design and
inadvertence, and the resulting variations are subjected to selection
on the criterion of efficiency. To quote Alchian, the economist's "ana-
lytical framework ... is closely akin to the theory of biological evolu-
tion. The economic counterparts of genetic heredity, mutations, and
natural selection are imitation, innovation, and positive profits." 8
Friedman and Alchian contended that, because Darwinian selec-
tion (or "adoption" to use Alchian's word) is at work, economists
need not worry about whether business managers make decisions by
knowingly invoking the concepts used by economists. The behav-
ior of firms can be explained and predicted without examining the
thoughts going through the heads of the managers.
This shared perspective of an environment selecting among varia-
tions led both economics and biology away from top-down expla-
nations and toward bottom-up understandings of complexity. 9
Extremely complex biological organisms exist not because they were
designed by a creator attending to every detail but because waste-
ful characteristics are typically selected out of the countless random
variations by the competition for resources. Likewise, extremely
complex and coordinated economic markets can arise without the
need for design by an all-knowing designer, merely by the competi-
tive actions of individual, atomistic actors.
The decades since these early interactions have been character-
ized by the convergence of the intellectual tools used in biology and
economics, as indicated by the influential scholarship both from a
number of biologists influenced by economics (such as Robert Triv-
ers, Maynard Smith, and Michael Ghiselin 20 ) and from a number of
18 Alchian, Uncertainty at 220 (cited in note 17).
A brief overview of some related history appears in the essay of Peter A. Corning,
Evolutionary Economics: Metaphor or Unifying Paradigm?, 18 J of Soc & Evo Systems
421 (1996) (reviewing two books on the intersection of economics and evolutionary
biology).
20 See, for example, Robert L. Trivers, Parent-Offspring Conflict, 14 Amer Zool
249 (1974); John Maynard Smith, Evolution and the Theory of Games (Cambridge
1982); Michael T. Ghiselin, Principles and Prospects for General Economy, in Gerard
Radnitzky & Peter Bernholz, eds, Economic Imperialism: The Economic Approach
Applied Outside the Field of Economics (Paragon House 1987).
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economists influenced by biology (such as Gary Becker, Jack Hirsh-
leifer, Paul Rubin, Robert Frank, and Herbert Gintis21). For instance,
in developing theories of optimal foraging and ritual combat, John
Maynard Smith and George Price borrowed heavily from economic
game theory and built on it, and then economists borrowed back,
incorporating evolutionary game theory.2 And in recent years,
economists and biologists have moved beyond borrowing from each
other to working together, yielding advances on both empirical and
theoretical fronts. 3
The combined influence of biologists thinking economically and
economists thinking biologically has lead to interesting and increas-
ing interdisciplinary endeavors, evident from even a casual glance
through economic and biological literatures3 4 To give just a brief fla-
vor of this:
21 See, for example, Gary S. Becker, Altruism, Egoism, and Genetic Fitness: Eco-
nomics and Sociobiology, 14 J Econ Lit 817 (1976); Jack Hirshleifer, Economics From
A Biological Viewpoint, 20 J L & Econ 1 (1977); Paul H. Rubin, Why is the Com-
mon Law Efficient?, 6 J Leg Stud 51 (1977) reprinted in Paul Rubin, ed, The Evolution
of Efficient Common Law (Edward Elgar 2007); Robert Frank, Cooperation through
Emotional Commitment, in Randolph Nesse, ed, Evolution and the Capacity for
Commitment (Russell Sage Foundation 2001); Herbert Gintis, Game Theory Evolv-
ing (Princeton 2000).
22 Peter Hammerstein & Edward H. Hagen, The Second Wave Of Evolutionary
Economics In Biology, 20 Trends in Ecology & Evolution 604, 604 (2005). As Mahoney
and Sanchirico put it:
Evolutionary game theory grew out of an intellectual volley between theoretical
biology and game theory. The history begins with an attempt by theoretical
biologists John Maynard Smith and George Price to understand ritual combat
within species. Unsatisfied with explanations provided by conventional evo-
lutionary theory, Maynard Smith and Price borrowed ideas from game theory,
modifying the interpretation of key constructs to fit the contours of animal
evolution. A decade or so later, many game theorists became dissatisfied with
the foundational assumptions underlying Nash equilibrium, in particular the
requisite assumption that players somehow know what their opponents are
going to do. In seeking explanations for the genesis of this common understand-
ing of strategic intent, game theorists turned to the concepts of learning and
evolution, thus borrowing back Maynard Smith and Price's earlier adaptation
of the game form to animal evolution. The result is the field of evolutionary
game theory.
Paul G. Mahoney & Chris W. Sanchirico, Competing Norms and Social Evolution: Is
the Fittest Norm Efficient?, 149 U Pa L Rev 2027, 2039-40 (2001).
13 Id at 604.
2 For one view of these interactions, see Geoffrey M. Hodgson, Taxonomizing the
Relationship Between Biology and Economics: A Very Long Engagement, 9 J Bioecon
169(2007).
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0 Recent years have seen the emergence of hybrid terms such
as "bioeconomics" 2s (sometimes "bionomics"2 6), "evolution-
ary economics, "27 and "neuroeconomics."
2
21 See, for example, Michael T. Ghiselin, A Bibliography for Bioeconomics, 2 J
Bioecon 233 (2000); Ulrich Witt, Bioeconomics as Economics from a Darwinian Per-
spective, 1 J Bioecon 19 (1999); Janet Tai Landa & Michael T. Ghiselin, The Emerging
Discipline Of Bioeconomics: Aims And Scope Of The journal Of Bioeconomics, I J
Bioecon 5 (2004); Michael T. Ghiselin, Biology, Economics, and Bioeconomics, in Uni-
versal Economics 71 (Paragon House 1992). It is currently unclear whether this term
has independently re-arisen, or is a resurfaced descendant of some scattered earlier
usages. The present use of "bioeconomics" should be distinguished from a prior, tem-
porarily floated use, from the 1970s, when "bioeconomics" referred to, for example,
"takfing] fuller account of man's use of energy in economic activities." Georgescu: A
Prophet of Energy Economics, Business Week, March 24, 1975, Industrial Edition. On
the other hand, it seems similar to the usage of the term in a 1913 work, the earliest we
can locate to use the term: Herman Reinheimer, Evolution by Co-operation: A Study
in Bio-Economics (Dutton 1913). The earliest example we have located of the term's
use in a science journal is William Borberg, Men and Their Sciences, 122 Science
183, 185 (July 29, 1955). The earliest example we have located of the term's use in an
economics journal is: Nicholas Georgescu-Roegen, Energy and Economic Myths, 41 S
Econ J 347, 369 (1975) (reporting that the term was first seen in a letter (date uncertain)
from liri Zeman).
26 See, for example, http://www.economyprofessor.com/economictheories/bionom
ics.php.
27 See, for example, Ulrich Witt's entry on Evolutionary Economics in The New
Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, online at http://www.dictionaryofeconomics
.com/article?id=pde2008E000295; David Boyce Hamilton, Evolutionary Econom-
ics: A Study of Change in Economic Thought (Transaction 1991); Gerhard Hanappi,
Evolutionary Economics: The Evolutionary Revolution in the Social Sciences (Alder-
shot 1994); John Laurent & John Nightingale, eds, Darwinism and Evolutionary
Economics (Edward Elgar 2001); Jack Vromen, Conjectural Revisionary Economic
Ontology: Outline of an Ambitious Research Agenda for Evolutionary Economics,
11 J Econ Methodology 213 (2004). See also, Thorbjorn Knudsen, Economic Selection
Theory, 12 J Evolutionary Econ 443 (2002); Geoffrey M. Hodgson, Darwinism in Eco-
nomics: From Analogy to Ontology, 12 J Evolutionary Econ 259 (2002); Trenton G.
Smith & Attila Tasnadi, A Theory of Natural Addiction, 59 Games & Econ Behav
316 (2007).
The first mention we can locate of the term "evolutionary economics" is in an
American Naturalist listing of programs at the World's Columbian Exposition of
1893. One program is there titled "Some American Problems of Evolutionary Eco-
nomics." The first full article we can locate using the term is Veblen's in 1898 (cited in
note 15).
Somewhat confusingly, there is another use of the term "evolutionary economics,"
somewhat unrelated to the use described here. See, for example, An Association for
Evolutionary Economics, online at http://www.afee.net/.
18 Paul W. Glimcher, Decisions, Uncertainty, and the Brain: The Science of Neuro-
economics (MIT 2002); C. Camerer, et al, Neuroeconomics: How Neuroscience Can
Inform Economics, J Econ Lit 9 (March 2005).
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" There are new journals such as the Journal of Bioeconomics29
and the Journal of Evolutionary Economics.30
" There is an international trend toward academic societies
that join these disciplines, such as the International Society
for Bioeconomics,31 and the Japan Association for Evolution-
ary Economics.
32
" There are many significant journal articles-such as Eco-
nomics from a Biological Viewpoint and Economic Models
in Ecology and Law and Biology-that explicitly tie biology
and economics together. 3
29 Contents of this journal, which began publication in 1999, can be viewed online
at http://www.springerlink.com/content/1573-6989/.
30 Contents of this journal, started in 1991, can be viewed online at http://www
.springerlink.com/content/ 1432-1386/?p=aeaa69aI 17ac44de8e30358e764e2118
&po=51.
1' See mentions online at http://www.springerlink.com/content/g262n873318671
wg/fulltext.pdf and http://www.springer.com/west/home/economics/journals?SGW
ID=4-40532-70-35644198-0.
32 Japan Association for Evolutionary Economics, online at http://www.econ
.kyoto-u.ac.jp/% 7Eevoeco/.
11 Jack Hirshleifer, Economics From A Biological Viewpoint, 20 J L & Econ 1
(1977); Jack Hirshleifer, Evolutionary Models in Economics and Law: Cooperation
Versus Conflict Strategies, 4 Research L & Econ 1 (1982); Jack Hirshleifer, Competi-
tion, Cooperation, and Conflict in Economics and Biology, 68 Econ & Bio 238 (May
1978); Michael T. Ghiselin, The Economy of the Body, 68 Econ & Bio 2,33 (May 1978);
Michael T. Ghiselin, Darwin, Progress, and Economic Principles, 49 Evolution 1029
(1995); David J. Rapport & James Turner, Economic Models in Ecology, 195 Science
367 (1977); Donald T. Campbell, Rationality and Utility from the Standpoint of Evo-
lutionary Biology, 59 J Business S355 (1986); Hammerstein & Hagen, (cited in note 25);
Ulrich Witt, Economics, Sociobiology, and Behavioral Psychology on Preferences, 12 J
of Econ Psych 557 (1991); Arthur J. Robson, The Biological Basis of Economic Behav-
ior, 39 J of Econ Lit 11 (2001); Robert Boyd & Peter J. Richerson, Sociobiology, Culture
and Economic Theory, 1 J Econ Behav & Org 97 (1980); Larry Samuelson & Jeroen
Swinkels, Information, Evolution and Utility, 1 Theoretical Econ 119 (2006); Larry
Samuelson, Analogies, Adaptation, and Anomalies, 97 J of Econ Theory 320 (2001);
Luis Rayo & Gary S. Becker, Evolutionary Efficiency and Happiness, 115 J Political
Econ 302 (2007); Herbert Gintis, A Framework for the Unification of the Behavioral
Sciences, 30 Behavioral & Brain Sciences 1 (2007); Hoffman, Law and Biology (cited
in note 3); Donald Cox, Biological Basics and the Economics of the Family, 21 J of
Econ Perspectives 91 (2007); Geoffrey M. Hodgson & Thorbjorn Knudsen, In Search of
General Evolutionary Principles: Why Darwinism is Too Important to be Left to the
Biologists, 10 J Bioeconomics 51 (2008); Bart Du Laing, Equality in Exchange Revis-
ited: From an Evolutionary (Genetic and Cultural) Point of View, in Law, Mind and
Brain 267 (Michael Freeman & Oliver R. Goodenough eds, Ashgate 2009); Bart Du
Laing, Dual Inheritance Theory, Contract Law, and Institutional Change? Towards
the Co-evolution of Behavior and Institutions, 9 German L J 491(2008). See also Felix
Hoffler, Why Humans Care About Sunk Costs While Animals Don't: An Evolution-
ary Perspective, MPI Collective Goods Preprint No. 2005/17, online at SSRN: http://
ssrn.com/abstract=808884.
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Similarly, there are numerous book chapters-such as Prin-
ciples and Prospects for General Economy and Evolution,
Learning, and Economic Behavior3 4-that do the same.3
" And there have been a number of full-length books on the
subject-such as Economics as An Evolutionary Science:
From Utility to Fitness and Sociobiology and Bioeconomics:
The Theory of Evolution in Biological and Economic Theory
and Second Nature: Economic Origins of Human Evolu-
tion-exploring the overlaps of, and useful cross-fertilization
between, economics and biology.
36
To be sure, interdisciplinary scholars in either of these fields will
disagree over the implications of the other field's insights. As Jack
Vromen describes, economists working with evolutionary theory
have broken themselves into three camps. One camp believes
that incorporating evolutionary theory into economics requires no
change in standard economic theory. A second camp thinks that the
basic structure of economic theory can remain intact, but details
differ when evolutionary theory is used. A third camp thinks that
evolutionary insights necessitate a complete revision of economic
theory. 7 Moreover, economists interested in behavioral biology can
confront a diversity of existing evolutionary approaches,3" just as
biologists interested in economics can confront competing views of
economic theory.
Nevertheless, all of these developments, historical and current,
reveal that the connections between economics and biology are
34 Reinhard Selten, Evolution, Learning, and Economic Behavior, 3 Games and
Economic Behavior 3 (1991).
31 See, for example, Michael T. Ghiselin, Principles and Prospects for General
Economy, in Gerard Radnitzky & Peter Bernholz, eds, Economic Imperialism: The
Economic Approach Applied Outside the Field of Economics (Paragon House 1987).
36 See, for example, Arthur E. Gandolfi, et al, Economics as Evolutionary Science:
From Utility to Fitness (Transaction 2002). Geoffrey M. Hodgson, Economics and
Evolution: Bringing Life Back into Economics (Michigan 1993). Michael T. Ghiselin,
The Economy of Nature and the Evolution of Sex (California 1974); Paul Seabright,
The Company of Strangers: A Natural History of Economic Life (Princeton 2004);
Peter Koslowski, ed, Sociobiology and Bioeconomics: The Theory of Evolution in
Biological and Economic Theory (Springer 1999); Eric D. Beinhocker, The Origin of
Wealth: Evolution, Complexity, and the Radical Remaking of Economics (Harvard
Business School 2006); Haim Ofek, Second Nature: Economic Origins of Human Evo-
lution (Cambridge 2001).
37 Jack J. Vromen, Taking Evolution Seriously: What Difference Does it Make for
Economics?, in John Davis, et al, eds, The Elgar Companion to Economics and Phi-
losophy 102, 103 (Edward Elgar 2004); Richard W. England, Evolutionary Concepts in
Contemporary Economics (Michigan 1994).
38 See generally, Kevin N. Laland & Gillian R. Brown, Sense and Nonsense: Evolu-
tionary Perspectives on Human Behaviour (Oxford 2002).
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deep, substantial, "deeply resonant" (in the words of Morris Hoff-
man39), and increasingly noticed.4" In sum, the deep structural rela-
tionship between economics and biology stems from the fact that
both fields focus on maximizing outcomes in the face of scarcity and
uncertainty. 41 And, when scarcity becomes relevant to survival and
reproduction, natural selection will (all else equal) favor those who
economize.42 This has inevitable implications for the ways behav-
ior-including behavior relevant to law43-is analyzed.
III. ECONOMICS AND BIOLOGY
The first step in comparing law and economics with law and behav-
ioral biology is to compare economics and behavioral biology inde-
pendent of law.44
A. Similarities
Beyond the fact that both fields deal with successful strategies for
coping with scarcity, economics and behavioral biology are similar
in many other, more specific ways. This section quickly surveys a
variety of examples.
11 Hoffman, Law and Biology at I (cited in note 3).
40 See, for example, Daniel Nettle, reviewing Economics as an Evolutionary
Science, 3 Human Nature Rev 21 (2003).
41 Gordon Tullock, Some Personal Reflections on the History of Bioeconomics, 1
J of Bioecon 13 (1999).
42 See generally, Alcock (cited in note 9); David D. Barash, The Survival Game
Theory Explains the Biology of Cooperation and Competition (Henry Holt 2004).
" Our main purpose in this article is to explore comparisons rather than applica-
tions. There are a variety of existing applications, however. For example, one arc of
research laid a theoretical foundation ("time-shifted rationality") for linking behav-
ioral biology and economics in the law-relevant context of "endowment effects," then
tested predictions of that foundation, and used the close fit between predictions and
data to develop a new theory of endowment effects. See Time-Shifted Rationality and
the Law of Law's Leverage (cited in note 6); S.F. Brosnan, et al, Endowment Effects in
Chimpanzees, 17 Current Bio. 1704 (2007); Jones & Brosnan, (cited in note 6).
4As should be clear from the foregoing, we are by no means the only scholars to
explore various conceptual relationships between the two fields. See, for example,
scholars cited in notes 20, 21, 33-35; Hoffman (cited in note 3); Hodgson, Bringing
Life Back (cited in note 36); Hodgson, Taxonomy (cited in note 24); Vromen, Taking
Evolution Seriously (cited in note 37); Hammerstein & Hagen (cited in note 22); R.R.
Nelson & S.G. Winter, An Evolutionary Theory of Economic Change (Belknap 1982);
Paul Krugman, What Economists Can Learn from Evolutionary Theorists-and Vice
Versa, in John Groenewegen & Jack Vromen, eds, Institutions and the Evolution
of Capitalism: Implications of Evolutionary Economics (Edward Elgar 1999) (1996
lecture to the European Association for Evolutionary Political Economy), online at:
http://web.mit.edu/krugman/www/evolute.html.
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At the most basic (and most obvious) level, the central subject
matter of both economics and behavioral biology is behavior. Note
that in their approaches to behavior, both economics and biology
assume that organisms can move toward optimal behavioral out-
comes without focused, prior, cognitive deliberation. 5
In studying behavior, both economics and biology seek to under-
stand the mulitiple influences on behavior, and both fields are gen-
erally interested in generating probabilistic but general predictions
about how most actors within large populations will behave. In
generating these predictions, both disciplines begin with an assump-
tion that, by and large,4 individuals behave in ways that reflect self-
interest (often streamlined down to wealth and reproductive success,
respectively) and that groups therefore tend to behave in ways that
reflect aggregated self-interest of constituent individuals. Moreover,
because each field seeks to understand how scarce resources (includ-
ing time and energy) can be efficiently allocated, each focuses on the
extent to which behavioral inclinations vary as environments vary.
In short, predicted behaviors are often context-specific.
As in many other fields, analyses in both economics and behavioral
biology tend to begin with simple, generally-accessible concepts that
are capable of yielding useful insights into their studied subjects. For
instance, one of the central ideas in economics is that price is a func-
tion of supply and demand.47 If demand for a good increases, price will
rise; if supply increases, price will fall. And one of the central ideas in
behavioral biology-natural selection-is that, in a world of varying
heritable traits, those that increase reproductive success more than
others tend to appear in increasing proportions in subsequent genera-
tions of individuals.48
" The fields of biology and economics do differ, however, in the extent to which
this assumption is invoked. It is more universally invoked in biology. Hirshleifer dis-
cusses this distinction in Hirshleifer, at 4 (cited in note 21).
46 There is some debate in biology whether the unit of selection is the gene exclu-
sively, or alternatively the gene, individual, group, or species, depending on context.
See Ridley, at Chapter 12 (cited in note 9). The two extremes can be surveyed in
Richard Dawkins, The Selfish Gene (Oxford 1976) and D.S. Wilson & E. 0. Wilson,
Rethinking the Theoretical Foundation of Sociobiology, 82 Q Rev Biology 327 (2007),
though most biologists continue to subscribe to the former of these two views. See
Ridley, at 310-15 (cited in note 9). On the extent to which biological self interest and
altruism toward kin, friends, or strangers can be reconciled, see Timothy H. Gold-
smith & William F. Zimmerman, Biology, Evolution, and Human Nature 126-38
(Wiley 2001).
" For a basic description, see Gary S. Becker, Economic Theory 4-7 (Knopf 1971).
48 For a basic description, see Trivers, Social Evolution 15-17 (Benjamin Cummings
Publishing Co. 1985). For further explanation, see Ridley, at 263-350 (cited in note 9).
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However, each field also contains subtle complexities that can
confound newcomers. Take, for example, the important but non-
obvious distinction in economics between "slopes" and "elastici-
ties" of demand (or supply) curves. Both the slope and the elasticity of
the demand curve measure the change in demand as price changes. In
common shorthand, the two terms are used interchangeably, with a
steeper demand curve also being described as less elastic. This usage
is accurate in the two limiting cases, where perfect inelasticity is the
same as a vertical demand curve and, at the other extreme, where
infinite elasticity is the same as a horizontal demand curve. But elas-
ticity and slope are not the same in cases between those extremes.
The slope of a demand or supply curve is defined as the change in
price divided by the corresponding change in quantity. If the price
decreases by $1 and demand increases by 10 units, the slope is 1/10.
If the price decreases by 1 dollar and demand increases by 1 unit,
the slope is 1/1, or 1. The price elasticity of demand, by contrast, is
defined as the percentage change in quantity demanded divided by
the corresponding percentage change in price. 49 If the price decreases
from $5 to $4 and demand increases from 2 to 3 units, the elastic-
ity is .5/-.2. When the "curve" is a slanted straight line, the slope
will be the same at all prices but the elasticity will not. 0 If the price
decreases from $5 to $4 to $3 while the number demanded increases
from 2 to 3 to 4 units, the slope is 1 and the elasticity (under one
definition) is .5/-.2 for the first decrease and .33/-.25 for the second
decrease of a dollar in the price. Consequently, the slope varies as a
function of measurement units, while the elasticity does not. If, in
the example above, the units were dozens of items and the change in
the number demanded is described as a change from 24 to 36 items
instead of from 2 to 3 dozen, the slope is 1/12 instead of 1, but the
elasticity remains at .5/-.2.
To take but one example of often-overlooked complexity in biol-
41 Walter Nicholson, Microeconomic Theory: Basic Principles and Extensions 755
(Dryden, 3d ed, 1985). There are two types of elasticity, depending on the size of the
change in price. It is called "point elasticity" when the change in price is infinitesi-
mally small and "arc elasticity" when the change in price is larger than that. The arc
elasticity depends on the size of the change in price. In addition, there are three ways
of measuring the arc elasticity.
s0 On a slanted straight demand curve, the coefficient of elasticity varies from infin-
ity (minus infinity, but we ignore the minus sign) for an infinitely small change at the
vertical axis intercept where quantity demanded is zero, to zero for an infinitesimal
change at the horizontal axis intercept where price per unit is zero. Elasticity coeffi-
cients calculated for points or arcs at prices below the midpoint are below one, which
is called "inelastic," while elasticity coefficients above the midpoint are above one,
which is called "elastic." (The elasticity coefficient at the midpoint is precisely one.)
For a treatment of the concept of elasticity, see Nicholson, at 172-82 (cited in note 49).
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ogy, people often assume that "fitness" can be measured by count-
ing offspring. While this measure is certainly helpful, determining
fitness is actually a bit more subtle. "Inclusive fitness" takes into
account the varying probability-according to degrees of consan-
guinity-that copies of genes will appear in near relatives other than
offspring, such as siblings, cousins, and nieces and nephews."1 Thus,
and counterintuitively, there are some circumstances in which an in-
dividual could increase her fitness by limiting her own reproductive
efforts (and thus offspring) and using the saved resources to increase
the reproduction of genetic relatives. Fitness is a subtle concept in
other ways, too. "Fitness" is relative, not absolute. It can be mea-
sured only with respect to a given environment. If the environment
changes, what is "fitter" will change as well.5 2 Subtle complexities
in the concepts of altruism, mutualism, cooperation, reciprocity, and
group selection can also confuse newcomers. 3
Because each field uses models to predict behavior and, conversely,
uses observed behavior to help test its models, identifying equilib-
rium behavior is important in each field. Without either a single
or relatively small finite number of equilibria, a model's predictive
usefulness is significantly hampered.14 In each field, the equilibrium
sought is the solution to a constrained maximization problem.5 In
both fields, the subject studied, if acting in her self interest, will
maximize the value of desired outcomes. However, in both fields,
the subjects also are assumed to be constrained by scarcity. Evolu-
tionary processes (including natural selection, the oldest economiz-
ing force in the history of life) tend to favor heritable behaviors that
maximize reproductive success, given limited intelligence, strength,
material resources, and the like. Correspondingly, firms survive and
-' Fitness can be viewed as a composite of both an individual's direct reproduction
of genes (through mating and offspring) and that individual's indirect reproduction of
genes (through increasing by aid the reproduction of genetic relatives). Alcock, at G-2
(cited in note 9). For a basic description of the concept of inclusive fitness, see Timothy
H. Goldsmith, The Biological Roots of Human Nature: Forging Links Between Evolu-
tion and Behavior 39-41 (Oxford 1991).
12 See generally, Douglas Futuyma, Evolution (Sinauer Associates 2005). For discus-
sion, see Todd Zywicki, Evolutionary Psychology and the Social Sciences, 13 Humane
Studies Rev, Issue 1 (Fall 2000).
s- See generally, S.A. West, et al, Social Semantics: Altruism, Cooperation, Mutual-
ism, Strong Reciprocity and Group Selection, 20 J Evol Biol 415 (2007).
14 For a brief discussion of the problems created when multiple equilibria are pos-
sible, see, Douglas G. Baird, Robert H. Gertner & Randal C. Picker, Game Theory and
the Law 39 (Harvard 1994).
15 See generally, Robert Cooter & Thomas Ulen, Law and Economics 16 (Pearson
Addison Wesley, 4th ed 2004) (describing relationship between equilibrium and maxi-
mizing behavior in economics).
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grow if they are better at maximizing profits than their competitors,
given costly human and physical capital.16 Understanding the effects
of scarcity is essential for identifying any interesting equilibrium
behavior.
In both fields, subjects studied interact with others. In modeling
behavior, then, it becomes necessary to incorporate a method for
studying strategic interactions. So both fields draw at times on game
theory for insights. 7 In both fields, interactions are sometimes one-
time interactions and other times are iterated, and optimal behaviors
tend to vary depending upon which type of interaction people encoun-
ter. Moreover, some environments and situations render competi-
tive strategies more successful than cooperative strategies, and vice
versa. For instance, at its most basic level, zero-sum game settings
tend to produce competition, while positive-sum game settings are
more likely to produce cooperation. 8 So each field has endeavored to
sort and study the two types of strategies separately.
Cooperation enables animals, human and nonhuman, to achieve
better outcomes, and it can enable them to compete more effectively
with others. Economists typically study cooperation in the form of
exchange, while biologists typically study cooperation as a form of
mutualism, aid to kin, and reciprocal altruism. In both fields, though,
stable cooperation is assumed to be in the self interest of all of its par-
ticipants. In both fields, cooperation sometimes enables its partici-
pants to specialize, and specialization increases the total welfare for
the participants by enabling them to reap larger gains and to do so at
relatively smaller total expenditures of effort.
56 On the relationship between profit maximization and survival, see Nicholson,
at 335 (cited in note 49).
s1 In economics, see, for example, R. Duncan Luce & Howard Raiffa, Games and
Decisions: Introduction and Critical Survey (Wiley 1967); H. Scott Bierman & Luis
Fernandez, Game Theory with Economic Applications (Addison-Wesley 1993); Eric
Rasmusen, Games and Information: An Introduction to Game Theory (Blackwell
1989). In biology, see, John Maynard Smith, Evolution and the Theory of Games (Cam-
bridge 1982); Barash, (cited in note 42); Lee Alan Dugatkin & Hudson Kern Reeve,
Game Theory and Animal Behavior (Oxford 2000). For a crossover work, by an econo-
mist writing about game theory in the biological context, see, Herbert Gintis, Game
Theory Evolving: A Problem-Centered Introduction to Modeling Strategic Behavior
(Princeton 2000).
58 With zero-sum games, one player loses what another gains, so the players are
naturally competing with one another to obtain gains and avoid losses. With posi-
tive sum games, some outcomes will benefit both parties. To help obtain that
mutual benefit, the parties are more inclined toward cooperation. See Scott Gates &
Brian D. Humes, Games, Information and Politics: Applying Game Theoretic Models
to Political Science 2 & n 4 (Michigan 1997) (discussing distinction between zero sum
and positive sum games).
Owen D. Jones, Erin O'Hara O'Connor, and Jeffrey Evans Stake 119
Interactions, whether cooperative or competitive, are complex and
messy in the real world. However, each discipline has found ways
to generate equilibrium self-interested behavior without knowing
everything there is to know about a given decision. One way to con-
front this complexity is to build uncertainty into the decision making
environment.59 How should an organism respond, given limited, or
asymmetric information? Another strategy for confronting complex-
ity is to count on spontaneous coordination or order to result from
multiple actions within each individual's self-interest. Economists
study spontaneous order in the forms of markets and industries,
while biologists study such order arising within social groups, and
occasionally within or between species. Consequently, scholars in
both economics and biology gain insights into complex phenomena
by focusing on the aggregated effects of the behaviors of individuals.
Both economics and biology examine short-term changes in behav-
ior that result from an exogenous change in the environment and
long-term, domino effects on the behaviors of other actors and the
actor herself.60 One consequence of this separate analysis is that in
both fields scholars are likely to distinguish carefully between behav-
iors that satisfy one's short-term interests and behaviors that serve
one's long-term interests. In both fields, investment is a primary
mechanism by which one trades off short-term and long-term bene-
fits. Investing in college, or in a friendship, or in a business enterprise
reflects short term costs in the form of forgone consumption oppor-
tunities. But that investment can yield long-term income or other
benefits that prove to be far more valuable. From a biological perspec-
tive, animals often invest in offspring in ways that reduce the number
of offspring one rears, while increasing their quality for future mating
competition. Or they may invest in a social alliance that costs now,
but may yield essential benefits later. From an inclusive fitness per-
spective, such behaviors may be optimal in the long run.
Models in both fields take account of the variety of ways that
changes can arise. For example, a firm's fortunes may improve
through conscious innovation, accidental discovery, or random mis-
fortune (such as a hurricane) befalling a competitor. Analogously,
in biology, an organism may out-compete its contemporaries as a
consequence of some new beneficial genetic mutation, some bene-
ficial new recombination of existing genes, or bad luck encountered
by competitors.
11 See, for example, Becker, at 57-66 (cited in note 9) (price theory lecture on the role
of uncertainty in economic models).
60 For a discussion of distinctions between short run and long run analyses in eco-
nomics, see Nicholson, at 298-319 (cited in note 49).
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In addition, both fields consider ways in which efficient behavior
tends to survive and repeat or reappear. In economics, this repetition
may manifest within a person, a firm, or an industry. It may also
manifest across persons, firms, and industries. When it manifests,
depending on context, repetition may be a function of one or more of
the following: observed and evaluated effects of accident or innova-
tion; simple imitation of others; learning from observing and analyz-
ing the behaviors of others; mere continuation of things that have
not yet resulted in disaster.6' In biology, the repetition of interest
is ordinarily trans-generational (though there are exceptions), and
these are ordinarily tabulated in copies of genes (which, all else being
equal, will increase proportionally over generations when inclining
organisms toward efficient behaviors). However, human behavioral
biology also accommodates the extent to which cultural influences
and evolved cognitive capacities can enable people either to identify
and deliberatively choose efficient behavior, or to imitate it for rea-
sons of cultural relatedness, independent of genetic relatedness. 62
The methodological tenets of the fields are similar and appealing
to outsiders. As sciences, both fields aspire to creating hypotheses
that are useful in predicting empirical observations.6 And scholars in
each share a desire to generate models that are both internally consis-
tent and consistent with one another. On one hand, this consistency
contributes to conceptual elegance in both fields. On the other, it
sometimes impedes in both fields the ability to closely analyze the
validity of the assumptions that tend to underlie many long-standing
models.M
Economics and behavioral biology are both easily (and in fact
commonly) caricatured with straw-men attacks and both confront
61 For a brief treatment of innovation and its spread, see Nicholson, at 273-75 (cited
in note 49).
62 See generally, Peter J. Richerson & Robert Boyd, Not By Genes Alone: How Cul-
ture Transformed Human Evolution (Chicago 2004); Robert Boyd & Peter 1. Richerson,
The Origin and Evolution of Cultures (Oxford 2005); Robert Boyd & Peter J. Richerson,
Sociobiology, Culture and Economic Theory, 1 J Econ Behav & Org 97 (1980) (arguing
that biology can be attractive to economists only by taking into account the role of
human culture); Joseph Henrich & Richard McElreath, Dual-Inheritance Theory: The
Evolution of Human Cultural Capacities and Cultural Evolution, in R.I.M. Dunbar
& Louise Barrett, eds, The Oxford Handbook of Evolutionary Psychology 555 (Oxford
2007).
6 See, for example, Milton Friedman, The Methodology of Positive Economics, in
Milton Friedman, Essays in Positive Economics 3-43 (Chicago 1935) (the ultimate goal
of economics is "the development of a 'theory' or 'hypothesis' that yields valid and
meaningful (i.e., not truistic) predictions about phenomena not yet observed.").
4 It should be noted here that Friedman, for one, argued that examination of the
validity of the assumptions was not a particularly important occupation. Id.
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supposed "refutations" constructed on the basis of a single example
when of course no one in either field would contend that their theory
describes or predicts the behavior of everyone. And the two fields
have in common at least two charges from critics. First, each has
been accused of being inherently politically conservative (or at least
too-easily playing into the hands of conservatives). 6 This tends to
make conservative audiences too receptive, and liberal audiences too
skeptical. Second, each has been accused of being too reductionistic.
66
This charge provides cover for those who claim that human behavior
is simply too complex to make the study of economic or biological
influences on human behavior worthwhile.
Some of the core challenges for both fields are similar, in that each
discipline must at one time or another confront behavioral complex-
ity in the form of seemingly irrational or maladaptive behavior.
6 7
For instance, both altruistic and spiteful behaviors require explana-
tion and reconciliation with the underlying theories.61 Moreover, in
the human contexts that concern us here, each discipline confronts
61 See, for example, Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law 27 (Aspen 6th ed.
2002); Anita Bernstein, Whatever Happened to Lawand Economics?, 64 Md L Rev 101
(2005); Arthur Leff, Economic Analysis of Law: Some Realism About Nominalism, 60
Va L Rev 451 (1974); Duncan Kennedy, Cost-Benefit Analysis of Entitlement Problems:
A Critique, 33 Stan L Rev 387 (1981). But others dispute the claim that rational choice
methods imply conservative outcomes. See, for example, David B. Spence, A Public
Choice Progressivism,Continued, 87 Cornell L Rev 397 (2002); David B. Spence, The
Shadow of the Rational Polluter: Rethinking the Role of the Rational Actor Model
in Environmental Law, 89 Cal L Rev 917 (2001); David B. Spence & Frank Cross, A
Public Choice Case for the Administrative State, 89 Geo L J 97 (2000). As to behavioral
biology, see Richard Lewontin, et al, Not in Our Genes: Biology, Ideology, and Human
Nature (Pantheon 1984). For an overview, see Ullica Segerstralle, Defenders of the
Truth: The Sociobiology Debate (Oxford 2001).
66 For a discussion of reductionism charges in economics, see Maxwell L. Stearns,
Public Choice and Public Law: Readings and Commentary 69-70 (Anderson 1997);
see also, Abner J. Mikva, Symposium on the Theory of Public Choice: Foreword, 74
Va L Rev 167 (1988) (making similar accusation about economic theories of political
behavior). For a discussion of these charges in biology, see Lewontin, et al (cited in note
65); Hodgson, at 235-51(cited in note 24) (addressing the problem of reductionism in
biology and economics); Goldsmith, at 139-41 (cited in note 51).
67 See, for example, Francesco Parisi & Vernon Smith, eds, The Law and Economics
of Irrational Behavior (Stanford 2005); Christine Jolls, et al, A Behavioral Approach to
Law and Economics, 50 Stanford L Rev 1471 (1998). For analysis of how biology can
illuminate various puzzles of economic irrationality, see Jones, Time-Shifted Ratio-
nality and the Law of Law's Leverage (cited in note 6).
66 Robert Frank does a nice job of explaining how both spiteful and altruistic behav-
iors can be accommodated within the concept of self-interest. Robert H. Frank, Pas-
sions Within Reason: The Strategic Role of the Emotions (Norton 1988). See also,
Timothy H. Goldsmith & William F. Zimmerman, Biology, Evolution, and Human
Nature 126-38 (Wiley 2001).
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(though often by different names) a variety of cognitive biases and
heuristics that-at least at first-seem paradoxical given the main
theoretical understructure. Common examples include hyperbolic
discounting, endowment effects, hindsight bias, confirmation bias,
and categorization by elimination.
69
These similarities explain why the literatures in economics
and behavioral biology often resonate with one another, and why
biologists and economists are frequently drawn to each other's dis-
ciplines.
B. Differences
Notwithstanding the important similarities just briefly described,
there are a number of significant differences between economics and
behavioral biology. These differences, surveyed briefly in this sec-
tion, can at times limit the usefulness of each discipline to the other.
However, some of the differences actually suggest synergistic bene-
fits that can be obtained through cross-fertilization.
The methods of the two disciplines differ in an important, thresh-
old way. Economics is embedded within social science traditions,
while behavioral biology is embedded within life science traditions.
As a consequence, economists and biologists differ in training, tools,
techniques, and even vocabulary. And these differences can cause
scholars in the two fields to talk past one another or to at least ini-
tially overlook the merits of one another's advances.7 0
Historically, economics has focused primarily on humans, and
only rarely and recently has ventured into non-human contexts. The
reverse sequence is true for behavioral biology, which historically
focused on nonhumans, and then gradually extended into human
contexts. As a consequence, economists often overlook the extent
to which human choices can be contextualized within the behav-
ioral choices and tendencies of animals generally. By missing these
connections, economists also can miss the implications for how an
understanding of natural selection can deepen our understanding of
human behavior. Conversely, biologists are sometimes uncomfort-
able plying their skills beyond non-human species, not only because
humans are more behaviorally complex, and their behavioral biology
69 For a discussion of these and other heuristics and biases, see Gerd Gigerenzer,
et al, Simple Heuristics That Make Us Smart (Oxford 1999); Daniel Kahneman, et al,
The Endowment Effect, Loss Aversion, and Status Quo Bias, 5 J Econ Persp 193 (1991);
Daniel Kahneman et al, eds, Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases (Cam-
bridge 1982).
70 For examples of the disciplines being slow to adopt advances made by the other,
see Hammerstein and Hagen, at 604-09 (cited in note 22).
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more politically controversial, but also because humans were simply
exempted, for a long period of the history of the discipline, from the
spectrum of the animal kingdom that biologists were trained to
investigate.
With respect to particular foci of study, economics is concerned
principally with market behavior (with some extensions into non-
market behavior71 ), while behavioral biology is focused principally
on non-market behaviors (with some extensions into market behav-
iors72 ). Even where their analytic tools are similar, then, scholars in
the two fields are not always interested in using those tools to explore
the same questions.
Moreover, even when they are focused on the same market or non-
market human behaviors, the canonical inquiries within the disci-
plines also vary significantly. Economists are mostly concerned with
the "how" questions-such as how people are likely to respond to
particular costs and benefits, given assumptions about their prefer-
ences. In other words, and ignoring important exceptions, 3 econo-
mists usually treat preferences as exogenous, and are often loathe to
explore either those preferences or their sources. Behavioral biolo-
gists are similarly concerned with these "how" questions, but their
interests extend beyond them. Once organisms within a species are
known to behave according to a particular set of preferences, biolo-
gists then ask "why" they may have those preferences. This natu-
rally leads to consideration of evolutionary processes, including the
effects of natural selection on behavioral predispositions.
To the economist, behavior reveals preferences. Future behavior
can be predicted from those preferences, regardless of origins, which
seem needless if preferences are clear and predictions confirmed.
These differing perspectives may usefully join, however, since people
have differing, sometimes competing preferences, and an inquiry into
the source of those preferences can better help us pick and choose
between preference possibilities to better predict behavior. For ex-
ample, what environmental factors, perceived by a brain evolved
to incline behavior in different ways in reaction to different envi-
ronmental conditions, will increase the probability of cooperative
" See, for example, Gary Becker, A Treatise on the Family (Harvard 1981); Gary S.
Becker & William M. Landes, eds, Essays in the Economics of Crime and Punishment
(National Bureau of Economic Research 1974).
72 See, for example, Randolph M. Nesse, ed, Evolution and the Capacity for Com-
mitment (Russell Sage Foundation 2001).
13 See, for example, Paul H. Rubin & Chris W. Paul H, An Evolutionary Model of
Taste for Risk, 17 Econ Inquiry 585 (1979); Gary S. Becker, Accounting for Tastes
(Harvard 1996).
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behavior, or competitive behavior? When and where are we likely to
observe risky behavior? 74
Insights into questions such as these may often benefit from sus-
tained inquiry into both the how and the why questions. (Biologists
distinguish these, respectively, as the necessarily complementary
"proximate," mechanistic questions on one hand and the "ultimate,"
evolutionary history questions on the other.7 ) Moreover, a concern
with the source of tastes may at times give behavioral biology an
advantage for legal analyses. Attention to the sources of tastes allows
not only consideration of how to change choices by changing prices,
it also allows anticipation of the varying difficulties law or other
nonmonetary pressures may encounter when attempting either to
change the tastes themselves or to alter behavior reflecting those
tastes7 6 Finally, preferences about future states invoke brain pro-
cesses that often incline subjects to erroneous predictions of their
future welfare, and behavioral biologists and cognitive neuroscien-
tists are contributing to a deeper understanding of the causes and
consequences of these errors.77
There is also a significant difference between economics and
behavioral biology in the dangerous ease with which people move
from positive analysis to normative conclusions. To derive a prescrip-
tive "ought" solely from a descriptive "is" is generally to commit a
logical error sometimes referred to as the "naturalistic fallacy."78 To
I For an early attempt to explore these questions, see Rubin & Paul (cited in
note 73).
71 For discussion of these central concepts, see Alcock, Animal Behavior, at 2-6
(cited in note 9); Goldsmith, at 6-11 (cited in note 51); John Alcock & Paul Sherman,
The Utility of the Proximate- Ultimate Dichotomy in Ethology, 96 Ethology 58 (1994);
Ernst Mayr, Cause and Effect in Biology, 134 Science 1501 (1961).
76 See Time-Shifted Rationality and the Law of Law's Leverage (cited in note 6).
" See, for example, Daniel T. Gilbert & Timothy D. Wilson, Prospection: Experi-
encing the Future, 317 Science 1351 (2007).
7' See David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature 469-70 (L.A. Selby-Bigge &
P.H. Nidditch, eds, Oxford, 2d ed 1978) (1740); and G.E. Moore, Principia Ethica 90
(Thomas Baldwin, ed, Cambridge rev ed 1993). We recognize that some object to the
merging of Moore's "naturalistic fallacy" with Hume's "is-ought" distinction. See
William H. Bruening, Moore and Is-Ought, 81 Ethics 143 (1971) (discussing whether
the naturalistic fallacy and the is-ought distinction are the same). We are also aware
that it is technically possible to derive ought from is in some narrowly-defined cir-
cumstances. Nonetheless, it is often a mark of defective reasoning. For arguments
that biologists have paid too much attention to the naturalistic fallacy and too little
attention to evolutionary ethics, see D. Wilson, et al, On the Inappropriate Use of
the Naturalistic Fallacy in Evolutionary Psychology, 18 Bio & Phil 669 (2003); Oliver
Curry, Who's Afraid Of The Naturalistic Fallacy?, 4 Evol Psychol 234 (2006); Alex
Walter, The Anti-Naturalistic Fallacy: Evolutionary Moral Psychology and the Insis-
tence of Brute Facts, 4 Evol Psychol 33 (2006).
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put it in economic terms, it is not necessarily the case that efficiency
should always be furthered, given that it could come at the cost of
more important competing goals. However, it is easy to slide from the
descriptive to the prescriptive. For example, a change that improves
the lives of individuals might not be a good thing if it harms the col-
lective. Some, perhaps especially some in other, less individualistic
cultures, might be willing to argue that the unit that matters is the
social unit, the tribe or nation, rather than the individual. Discus-
sions about what is efficient make it hard for such views to find a
place in the normative conversation because they are outside the
traditional economic calculus.
Moreover, many efficiency arguments are grounded in Kaldor-
Hicks efficiency. Changes are Kaldor-Hicks efficient if total benefits
exceed total costs. 79 A change can be efficient under this definition
even though some individuals will be made worse off by the change."°
Additionally, this notion of efficiency requires that the evaluator
compare losses of one person to gains of another. It might be efficient,
for example, for the government to make a poor person a bit worse off
in order to make a rich person a lot better off."1 Since law and econom-
" Kaldor-Hicks efficiency is sometimes described as "potential Pareto efficiency".
If side payments from winners to losers could be made, a Kaldor-Hicks efficient change
could be converted into a Pareto efficient change. But the side payments are not made
and changes can be Kaldor-Hicks efficient even though some parties are worse off for
the change.
10 Robert Cooter & Thomas Ulen, Law and Economics 48 (Pearson Addison Wesley,
4th ed. 2004).
1 To take a different example, suppose that the government has a house that it
does not need any longer and which it decides to give away. Only two citizens want
the house, a poor woman and a rich man. Suppose the government knows that the
woman would value the house at exactly $10,000 and the man would value the house
at exactly $50,000. If the house is given to the man, it would be possible for the man to
pay the woman $30,000 and make both of them happier than if the house were given to
the woman. Since it would be possible for the winner to make such a payment, award-
ing the house to the rich man is the efficient choice, according to the Kaldor-Hicks
test, even if that transfer payment is never made. Now suppose, in addition, that the
poor woman would get more utility out of the house than the rich man. In such a case,
the efficient decision under the Kaldor-Hicks concept of efficiency is at odds with the
decision that will generate the greater increase in happiness.
Moreover, what do we mean when we say that a change will make people better
or worse off? Maybe we are talking about monetary wealth, maybe peace of mind,
maybe personal security. If we leave the objective unspecified, then it is easier to be
convinced by the normative analysis that follows. But sometimes economists too get
accused of turning their positive analysis into contentious normative claims. Sup-
pose, for example, that a rapist can get so much positive utility from a rape that his
benefits exceed the costs to the rape victim. The rape is Kaldor-Hicks efficient, and
yet virtually no one believes as a normative matter that the rape should be legal, let
alone encouraged.
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ics analysis often applies, whether expressly or impliedly, the Kaldor-
Hicks criterion, policy makers ought not jump from the statement that
a change is efficient to the conclusion that the change is desirable.82
However, "efficiency" evokes such strongly favorable sentiments
that once it is determined that choice A is more efficient than choice
B, many will find that analysis sufficient to justify choice A. Because
efficiency is like motherhood and apple pie, an analysis that shows
one law to be more efficient than another law as a matter of positive
analysis also has assumed normative implications even though the
logical connection has not been established. There is, at least today,
8 3
no correspondingly seductive connection between what is reproduc-
tively successful and what is "good". Therefore, it is much easier to
avoid the mistake of drawing a normative implication from a bio-
logical description. For example, reproductive success may be "good"
for organisms and genes. But those who try to make the unwarranted
jump to the conclusion that policies that would increase reproductive
success should be pursued for that reason will immediately be asked
to explain why this is so. Whereas the very idea of "efficiency" sounds
normatively attractive (who argues for the virtue of inefficiency?), the
normative implication of reproduction, in contrast, is obviously con-
textually embedded, and lacking in universal appeal.84
Economics and biology also approach the subject of change rather
differently. Earlier we treated innovation and mutation as similar
concepts precisely because each enables models of humans and
12 The Kaldor-Hicks criterion is obviously normative. Not only can it be put to pre-
scriptive purposes, it seems to have been designed for use in normative analysis. One
positive purpose to which the Kaldor-Hicks definition can be put is in the hypothesis
that a branch of government behaves in a such way as to achieve Kaldor-Hicks effi-
ciency. For example, one might argue that common law courts come to rules that are
efficient in that sense. See, for example, Posner, Economic Analysis of Law (Aspen,
7th ed. 2007). It is not a large step from that hypothesis, however, to the argument that
the common law rules are good rules. There is no corresponding normative standard
in biology.
"3 Social Darwinism (more properly "Social Spencerism", see Jones & Goldsmith,
at 492-94 (cited in note 4)) no longer has much support among those who make or
influence policy. But this should raise a cautionary flag for law and economics. If
policy makers could make the stupefying leap from what is reproductive to what is
good, it should be all the easier to make the seemingly smaller jump from what is
efficient to what is good. One lesson that we might take from the biologists' caution
is to better question the assumptions regarding preferences, costs, and benefits that
underlie the efficiency analysis used in economics.
'" Note, too, that the subjects of economics (efficient regulation of markets, for
example) frequently evoke less emotional reactions than reproductive biology (for ex-
ample, children). This may be one more reason why the assumptions of the economist
are more likely to remain unobserved by the student than are the assumptions of the
biologist.
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human behavior to incorporate change.85 But the changes occur
differently in each realm. Consider first innovation: a good idea can
often quickly induce long-lasting and productive change. This is
less true in biology, where all genetically heritable changes are, with
the exception of modern technological manipulations, the function
of genetic mutation or recombination. Natural selection may sort
genes and genetic combinations. But nature does not create new ones
as a function of some perceived opportunity. And humans cannot, at
least without significant technological advancement, create signifi-
cant genetic changes for the species by consciously responding to
new opportunities. In short, in biology, there is no watchmaker; in
economics there is.
8 6
Because economically relevant change is easier for humans, eco-
nomic behavior is more easily modified by moving directly between
local optima than is biological behavior change. For example, a car
company might entirely abandon one method of supplying its facto-
ries to instead imitate another company's more successful method.
In contrast, evolutionary biologists tend to study changes in behavior
that are unlikely to reflect movement directly between local optima.
The biological constraint stems from the fact that organisms are path
dependent and unlikely to move to a suboptimal position, even if it
might eventually lead to a superior local optimum, and from the fact
that organisms can only work with the variability genetics supplies,"
not with the variability that a good idea or experienced need might
recommend. 81
Another difference between economics and biology revolves
's See Part IV.A.
86 Some current critics of Darwinism rely on an old "watchmaker" argument for
the existence of God, an argument that Darwin himself rebutted. The essence of the
argument is that anatomical features that perform certain functions so well must have
been designed to do so by some designer, just as a watch must have been designed by
a watchmaker. See David Hume, Dialogues Pt. II; William Paley, Natural Theology
(Printed for Daniel and Samuel Whiting, 6th ed 1803). The argument is an evolved
form of one that dates back at least to Cicero. "When you see a sundial or a water-
clock, you see that it tells the time by design and not by chance. How then can you
imagine that the universe as a whole is devoid of purpose and intelligence, when it
embraces everything, including the artifacts themselves and the artificers." Cicero, as
quoted in Daniel C. Dennett, Darwin's Dangerous Idea (Simon & Schuster 1995) at
29 n 5. See also, Richard Dawkins, The Blind Watchmaker (Norton 1986).
87 For a discussion of movement between local optima and their limitations in
biology, see Timothy H. Goldsmith, The Biological Roots of Human Nature: Forging
Links Between Evolution and Behavior 34 (Oxford 1991).
" Dawkins is reported to have said something to the effect of: No one would expect
pigs to sprout wings, notwithstanding that they could come in handy from time to
time. Relatedly, see Kam Patel, Going the Whole Hog, The Times Higher Education
Supplement (Apr 28, 1995) (interviewing Richard Dawkins).
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around the concept of consumption. It was pointed out above that
the idea of investment is critically important to both disciplines.
However, the idea of individual consumption-just for its own
sake-is not similarly shared. From the biological point of view, any
deployment of resources that does not contribute directly or indi-
rectly to reproduction (at least of relatives) is arguably wasteful. And
animals that engage in wasteful behaviors may in the long run, be
less reproductive than contemporaries inclined to behave more effi-
ciently. If so, heritable inclinations toward less productive behavior
risk being wiped out by the economizing force of natural selection.
Consequently, whereas economists are comfortable contemplating
tradeoffs between consumption and investment, biologists generally
continue to analyze only tradeoffs among investments.
These differences between economics and biology, and others like
them, underscore why economists and biologists do not always see
eye to eye, and why it would be a mistake to assume that biological
and economic insights will always converge.
IV. LAW & ECONOMICS MEETS LAW &
BEHAVIORAL BIOLOGY
Against the background of the prior Part, we can now consider the
similarities and differences between the intersection of law and eco-
nomics, on one hand, and law and behavioral biology, on the other.
A. Similarities
Obviously, the core similarities of the underlying disciplines dis-
cussed in Part III generate similarities in the ways that each field
intersects with law. Beyond those already mentioned, there are a few
additional similarities to note.
Because both economics and behavioral biology develop theo-
retical constructs for explaining and predicting human behaviors,
each subfield of law attracts scholars interested in improving law's
functioning by applying or even improving its theories of human
behavior. Not surprisingly, then, there are some key overlapping
personnel. For example, a number of prominent law and economics
scholars-such as Richard Epstein,89 Mark Grady,90 Richard Posner,91
19 See, for example, Richard Epstein, A Taste for Privacy?: Evolution and the Emer-
gence of a Naturalistic Ethic, 9 J Leg Stud 665 (1980); Richard Epstein, The Varieties
of Self-Interest, 8 Social Phil & Pol 102 (1990).
90 See, for example, Mark Grady & M.T. McGuire, A Theory of the Origin of Natural
Law, 8 J Contemp Legal Issues 87 (1997); Mark Grady & M.T. McGuire, The Nature of
Constitutions, I J Bioeconomics 227 (1999).
1 See, for example, Richard Posner, Sex and Reason (Harvard 1992).
Owen D. Jones, Erin O'Hara O'Connor, and Jeffrey Evans Stake 129
1500
1400
1300
1200
1100
1000
900
800
.' 700
2 600
z 500
400
300
200
100
0
Years
Figure 1. Articles in Westlaw "Journals & Law Reviews" Database. Search term:
dates (is [year]) & evol! & biolog! & econ!
and Paul Rubin 92 -have already drawn attention in legal contexts to
important parallels between economics and biology. And the annual
number of articles in law that mention biology, evolution, and eco-
nomics in the same piece, in one way or another, shows a nearly con-
stantly upward trend, by year, with roughly 1418 law review articles
in 2008 alone. 93 (See Figure 1.)
Because each subfield of law seeks a unifying theory for both human
behavior and law, each sparks concerns about possible disciplinary
imperialism. This inevitably raises suspicions of political motives,
which have been compounded in part by the openly conservative
perspectives of some of the scholars just mentioned. Indeed, some
skeptics of law and biology have expressed concern that the study
of human behavioral biology might somehow inherently appeal to
92 See, for example, Paul H. Rubin, Why is the Common Law Efficient?, 6 J Leg
Stud 51 (1977) reprinted in Paul Rubin, ed, The Evolution of Efficient Common Law
(Edward Elgar 2007); Paul Rubin, Darwinian Politics: The Evolutionary Origin of Free-
dom (Rutgers 2003).
13This evidence is illustrative, but imperfect. First, it would be useful to also know
percentage trends, which would require correction for differences from year to year in
the total number of law review articles published. (That is, the number of articles com-
bining these terms could be increasing at the same time that the percentage combining
them is decreasing.) Second, the search term is very rough. It is likely over-inclusive
in some ways, and under-inclusive in others. For an article combining law, economics,
and evolutionary biology, see for example Mark Roe, Chaos and Evolution in Law and
Economics, 109 Harv L Rev 641 (1996).
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those with a penchant to politicize issues. 94 Will conservative schol-
ars turn to law and behavioral biology as a tool, to be deployed in
ways consistent with (broadly speaking) conservative agendas?
Or reciprocally, for that matter, will liberal scholars turn law and
behavioral biology into a tool, to be deployed in ways consistent with
(broadly speaking) liberal agendas? Our own view is that neither of
these forms of politicization is either inevitable or desirable. As with
law and economics, the theoretical construct and empirical insights
derived from behavioral biology should appeal to legal scholars who
merely wish to better understand our world, its current legal poli-
cies, and the potential impact of future policy reforms. To succeed at
this endeavor, however, scholars in law and behavioral biology must
proceed cautiously. We therefore revisit this issue in Part V.
Another similarity between the intersections of economics and
biology with law concerns the difficulty of achieving an appropriate
balance, for legal readers, between main themes and subtle details.
As a consequence of the interplay between main themes that are
quickly accessible, and subtleties that are not, law and economics
had to find ways, in early years, to educate readers on the basics of a
technical discipline, before one could then explore possible implica-
tions in legal contexts. The same is true for law and biology. Striking
the right balance is more challenging than it might first appear, and
more important than its inherently procedural nature may sound,
given the subtleties that must inevitably be skipped in summariz-
ing fundamentals, the need to repeat key concepts for those new to
the topic, and the limitations on space and reader patience for back-
ground information before getting to interesting applications.
As John Monahan has argued in overview, 9 both law and behav-
ioral biology, on one hand, and law and economics, on the other, have
great heuristic power, great breadth, and great depth. The similar
heuristic power stems from the abilities of each to raise large sets of
interconnected questions, and also to explore those questions empir-
ically. Clearly, this does not and should not dictate conclusions about
what we should and should not do with legal policy. Yet, at the same
time, the two interdisciplinary fields can each help us learn more
14 This was, for example, one of the major concerns expressed at a conference on
behavioral biology and feminism, at Emory University Law School, in December 2006.
(And this may have reflected in part the perception, signalled in the conference Call
for Papers, that law and economics scholars may be especially prone to find evolu-
tionary perspectives appealing; the Call for Papers had indicated that a key topic of
inquiry should be: "The relationship between evolutionary biology and economics, and
between the emerging field of "Law and Evolution" and the established field of Law and
Economics.") Moreover, the possible relationship between biology and conservatism
has garnered continuing attention in both academic and media outlets. See, for example,
A Split Emerges as Conservatives Discuss Darwin, New York Times, May 5, 2007.
9s Monahan (cited in note 2).
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about the underlying causes of and patterns in behaviors that matter
to us. This may thereby aid the efficient and effective pursuit with
legal tools of social goals already in place, and also help us better
anticipate how various legal interventions may affect future behav-
ior in both intended and unintended ways.
The great breadth to which Monahan refers reflects the fact that
both interdisciplinary areas address extraordinarily wide ranges of
behavior, with general principles of broad applicability. Because the
theories and findings of economics and behavioral biology are not
limited to particular human activities, there is potential for utility,
in law, across a wide range of legal contexts.96 And the great depth
to which Monahan refers reflects the fact that both interdisciplinary
areas hold promise to extend far below surface generalities. These
interdisciplinary areas provide tools that can penetrate into specific
legal contexts. And, each is capable of generating sophisticated, often
counterintuitive insights into human behavior and law.97
96 In law and economics, this was demonstrated most vividly by Richard Posner's
book Economic Analysis of Law. There are also numerous applications in law and
behavioral biology (see www.sealsite.org). For example, Jones & Goldsmith (cited in
note 4), catalogue, describe, and illustrate a large set of applications, including: dis-
covering useful patterns in regulable behavior; uncovering conflicts among contem-
poraneously pursued legal policies; sharpening the cost-benefit analyses that often
influence legal policymaking; clarifying links between various causal influences and
their effects on human behavior; increasing our understanding about human decision-
making; providing theoretical foundation for, and potential predictive power about,
a variety of human behaviors; disentangling the multiple causes of various law-
relevant behaviors; exposing a variety of unwarranted assumptions underlying legal
approaches for inspiring behavioral changes; assessing the comparative effectiveness
of legal strategies we employ to change specific behaviors; revealing deep patterns in
legal architecture; and identifying under-noticed and unintended selection pressures
that legal systems can themselves create.
" See, for example, Jeffrey Evans Stake, Mandatory Planning for Divorce, 45 Vand
L Rev 397 (1992) (efficiency could be advanced by requiring people to plan for divorce
at the time of marriage); Jones & Goldsmith (cited in note 4); Maxwell L. Stearns, The
Public Choice Case Against the Item Veto, 49 Wash & Lee L Rev 385 (1992) (using
economic analysis to argue that a line item veto would not reduce pork barrel spending
but might enhance the President's influence over public interest legislation); Linda
Cohen & Matthew Spitzer, Term Limits, 80 Geo L J 477 (1992) (using economic anal-
ysis to argue that term limits enhance interest group influence on legislators); John
J. Donohue & Peter Seigelman, The Changing Nature of Employment Discrimina-
tion Litigation, 43 Stan L Rev 983, 1024 (1991) (laws against discrimination in fir-
ing employees may increase discrimination in hiring); Jeremy Bentham, Defence of
Usury, Shewing the Impolity of the Present Legal Restraints on the Terms of Pecuni-
ary Bargains in a Series of Letters to a Friend. To Which is Added a Letter to Adam
Smith, Esq; LL.D. on the Discouragements Opposed by the Above Restraints to the
Progress of Inventive Industry (1787) (laws against usury hurt borrowers); George L.
Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J Leg Stud 1
(1984) (whether the law is pro-plaintiff or pro-defendant cannot be determined by the
percentage of cases won); Robert P. Albon, Lawyers and the Rental Market for Hous-
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B. Differences
As with the similarities, the core differences between economics and
behavioral biology also seem to generate differences in the ways in
which each field intersects with law. For example, because econom-
ics has long focused on human behavior, economic concepts can be
easily transported to the human context without objection by legal
academics. In contrast, because behavioral biology has only more
recently focused on the biological underpinnings of human behavior,
it is natural for legal academics to initially question its fundamental
applicability to law.
Moreover, in particular legal contexts, one field's tools can be rela-
tively more useful than the other's. For example, law and economics
holds the promise of analyses that translate a specific change in one
thing (say, minimum wage, or a tax on gasoline) into a specific change
in another (say, the unemployment rate, or consumption of gasoline
and purchase of SUVs). In contrast, law and behavioral biology will
do relatively less well at predicting changes in modern law, econo-
mies, and other cultural environments. At the same time, behavioral
biology is relatively better equipped to explain preferences (as well as
changes in preferences) and to both explain and predict some of the
human behaviors those preferences generate. For example, biology is
better at explaining why some behaviors are relatively unresponsive
to marginal legal changes. Moreover, the biological models do a better
job of both explaining and predicting behaviors within families than
do the purely individualistic economic models. And, evolutionary
insights help make sense of seemingly unstable preferences, behav-
ioral anomalies, 98 heuristic thought processes, 99 and moral behaviors
and judgments.100
Lug: a Critical Appraisal or a Conversation Between two Academics in a Hotel Bar, in
Ross Cranston and Anne Schick, eds, Law and Economics 105-11 (Australian National
University 1982) (reforms make some tenants buy housing goods they do not want to
buy); Daniel P. Schwallie, Note: The Implied Warranty of Habitability as a Mecha-
nism for Redistributing Income: Good Goal, Bad Policy, 40 Case W Res L Rev 525
(1989-90) (law reform may hasten withdrawal of tenant quarters from the housing
market); Ronald Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J L & Econ 1 (1960) (initial
allocation of rights may not matter to efficient allocation; and, negative externalities
depend as much on the recipient as the source).
91 These issues are discussed in Richard A. Epstein, Skepticism and Freedom,
141-43, 194-227 (Chicago 2003); Jones, Time-Shifted Rationality and the Law of Law's
Leverage (cited in note 6).
99 Jonathan Haidt, Rapporteur, Group Report: What Is the Role of Heuristics in
Making Law?, in Gerd Gigerenzer & Christopher Engel, eds, Heuristics and the Law
239, 241-43 (MIT 2006).
' See generally, Frans de Waal, Good Natured: The Origins of Right and Wrong in
Humans and Other Animals (Harvard U Press, 1996); Jonathan Haidt & Craig Joseph,
3 The Moral Mind in The Innate Mind, 367 (P. Carruthers, S. Laurence & S. Stich,
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Because fitness maximization has fewer normative implications
than does wealth maximization, as mentioned earlier, the possible
legal policy implications of behavioral biology will very rarely seem
as evident as they will for economics. On the other hand, behavioral
biology may sometimes explain more usefully than economics why
humans often behave in law-relevant ways that seem contrary to
utility maximization (at least in the sense that law and economics
scholars typically invoke the term).
Finally, because the historical political baggage that biology and
economics contend with differs, the core criticisms of each of their
intersections with law also differ. The economic focus on increasing
total welfare (the size of the pie) at the expense of distributional con-
cerns has led to accusations that when legal policymakers listen to
economists the result is an exacerbation of the stratification of eco-
nomic wealth. In contrast, biology must contend with having been
misinvoked for, but nonetheless associated with, genocidal move-
ments. Specifically, the genocidal activities of former Nazi Germany
(themselves a reflection of eugenic policies openly adopted earlier
in the United States'0 1 ) have cast a long shadow over any attempt to
use insights from biology for purposes that overlap in any way with
governmental (and in this case legal) aims. 10 2
Several additional, significant differences between law and eco-
nomics and law and behavioral biology stem from differences in the
age and maturity of the two subfields. Law and economics started as a
movement several decades ago,103 and, as is common to more mature
fields, law and economics has more readily available grant money,
a variety of scholarly journals, 104 and other accessories of interdis-
ciplinary arenas that are both maturely developed and widely sub-
eds, Oxford 2007); Robinson, Kurzban, and Jones, The Origins of Shared Intuitions of
Justice (cited in note 4); Owen D. Jones & Robert Kurzban, Intuitions of Punishment,
77 Chi L Rev 1633 (2010). For discussion, see Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, ed, The Evo-
lution of Morality: Adaptations and Innateness (MIT 2008).
101 See generally Daniel J. Kevles, In the Name of Eugenics: Genetics and the Uses
of Human Heredity (Knopf 1985); Elof Axel Carlson, The Unfit: A History of a Bad
Idea (Cold Spring Harbor Laboratory 2001).
102 For discussion of why behavioral biology offers no support for eugenic policies,
see Jones & Goldsmith, at 494-95 (cited in note 4).
103 For a concise historical overview of law and economics, see Keith N. Hylton,
Calabresi and the Intellectual History of Law and Economics, 64 Md L Rev 85
(20051.
'04 Journals include the Journal of Law and Economics; the Journal of Legal Studies;
The American Law and Economics Review; The Supreme Court Economic Review;
the Journal of Law, Economics and Organization; the International Review of Law and
Economics; Review of Law and Economics; the European Journal of Law and Econom-
ics; Research in Law and Economics; Journal of Competition Law and Economics;
Journal of International Economic Law; Antitrust Law and Economics Review; and
The Economics of Legal Relationships.
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scribed. 10s Law and economics has benefitted not only from advocacy
by the amazingly prolific writing of Richard Posner and others, but
also from the entrepreneurial skills of Henry Manne and the eco-
nomic clout of the Olin Foundation. Manne created highly successful
retreats, informally dubbed "Pareto in the Pines," for law professors
and judges, and has written about building law and economics as an
institutional movement. 106 Olin, for its part, sponsored law and eco-
nomics programs around the country, providing scholars with both
the time and incentives to do law and economics oriented work.
Early efforts in law and behavioral biology did not spread as
quickly. However, continuing collaborations within and between the
Gruter Institute for Law and Behavioral Research'07 and the Society
for Evolutionary Analysis in Law 08 have sparked substantial, steady,
and continuing scholarly interest, and increasing flows of grant
money have begun to support developments in law and behavioral
biology.09
The field of law and behavioral biology is developing more slowly
than did law and economics, and will probably continue to do so,
because not only are there far more lawyers with economic training
than with biology training (let alone training in behavioral biology),
far more legal thinkers are trained in the social sciences than in the
life sciences. Moreover, in law and economics, some of the founda-
tional works were written by economists interested in law, while
law tends to hold considerably less appeal for biologists. Last, many
of the questions first raised by law and economics were low-hanging
fruit; fields such as antitrust, securities, corporations, contracts, tax,
and the regulation of explicit economic markets were all self-evident
candidates for applying the economic microscope."0 And, unsurpris-
ingly, the fields where law and economics is most fully developed
remain those like antitrust, whereas economics has had less develop-
ment and influence in other fields. On first glance, it would appear
that there are fewer fields in law offering low-hanging fruit to biolo-
101 At least 10 law and economics associations exist worldwide. See American Law
and Economics Association website, online at http://www.amlecon.org/links.html
(listing 9 other organizations).
106 See, for example, Henry G. Manne, How Law and Economics was Marketed
in a Hostile World: A Very Personal History, in Francesco Parisi, Charles K. Rowley,
eds, The Origins of Law and Economics: Essays by the Founding Fathers 309 (Edward
Elgar 2005).
107 Gruter Institute for Law and Behavioral Research, online at http://www.gruter
institute.org.
108 Society for Evolutionary Analysis in Law, online at http://www.sealsite.org.
119 For example, in 2007 the MacArthur Foundation initiated a $10,000,000 project
on Law and Neuroscience. See http://www.lawneuro.org.
110 See Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law 23 (Aspen, 6th ed 2002).
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gists. Criminal law, family law, and torts come easily to mind, but
beyond that, the applications of biology to law are often less direct
than the applications of economics to law."' Coase has argued that
economics started as law and economics.'1 2 Biology certainly did not
start as law and biology.
V. RECOMMENDATIONS
To this point, we have surveyed the similarities and differences
between biology and economics, and compared how law and behav-
ioral biology, as a young interdisciplinary field, compares with the
more established field of law and economics. Here, we offer a variety
of recommendations for the future to existing and new scholars
in both fields (particularly the younger field), as well as to those
approaching law and biology scholarship from the outside.
1) The study of and knowledge about the influences of bio-
logical processes, including evolutionary, behavioral
genetic, and neuroscientific ones, on human behavior has
grown dramatically in recent decades. Prior debates about
the extent of these influences on human behavior, particu-
larly in the 1970s and 1980s," 3 did little to stem the accel-
erating growth of the underlying scientific work. For ex-
ample, evolutionary perspectives on human behavior have
appeared with increasing frequency not only in biology, but
also in anthropology, psychology, psychiatry, philosophy,
sociology, political science, and medicine.1 4 And reference
" Thanks to Todd Zywicki for this point.
112 Ronald Coase, Speech to First Annual Meeting of the American Law and Eco-
nomics Association, May 25, 1991, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign.
113 See, for example, The Sociobiology Debate: Reading on the Ethical and Scien-
tific Issues Concerning Socbiobiology (Arthur L. Caplan, ed., 1978); Not in Our Genes,
(cited in note 65).
14 For just a small sampling, see Goldsmith & Zimmerman (cited in note 46);
Bobbi S. Low, Why Sex Matters: A Darwinian Look at Human Behavior (Princeton
2001); Lee Cronk, et al, eds, Adaptation and Human Behavior: An Anthropologi-
cal Perspective (Aldine de Gruyter 2002); Peter J. Richerson & Robert Boyd, Not By
Genes Alone: How Culture Transformed Human Evolution (Chicago 2004); David
Buss, Evolutionary Psychology: The New Science of the Mind (Allyn and Bacon, 3d
ed 2007); David Buss, ed, The Handbook of Evolutionary Psychology (John Wiley &
Sons 2005); Robin Dunbar & Louise Barrett, eds, Oxford Handbook of Evolutionary
Psychology (Oxford 2007); Steven W. Gangestad & Jeffrey A. Simpson, eds, The Evo-
lution of Mind: Fundamental Questions and Controversies (Guilford 2007); Steven
Pinker, The Blank Slate: The Modern Denial of Human Nature (Viking 2002); Michael
McGuire & Alfonso Troisi, Darwinian Psychiatry (Oxford 1998); Anthony Stevens
& John Price, Evolutionary Psychiatry: A New Beginning (Routledge 2000); Human
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Figure 2. Articles in Westlaw "Journals & Law Reviews" Database. Search term:
dates(isyear]) and (evolution! /p biolog!) or (Darwin! /pb iolog!) or (evolution /s
psychol!) or "evolutionary biology" or "evolutionary psychology" or sociobiology or
"behavioral biology".
to and use of behavioral biology in legal scholarship has
increased commensurately."' (See Figure 2.) Consequently,
it seems likely that behavioral biology perspectives on law-
relevant human behaviors will continue to be fruitful for
research for a long time to come. And an investment in the
field of law and behavioral biology can therefore yield sub-
stantial rewards.
2) Law and behavioral biology is not simply law and econom-
ics in another guise. The trajectories and implications of
law and economics on one hand and law and behavioral
biology on the other are not identical, despite a number of
Nature and Public Policy: An Evolutionary Approach (Palgrave Macmillan 2003);
Albert Somit & Steven A. Peterson, eds, Evolutionary Approaches in the Behavioral
Sciences: Toward a Better Understanding of Human Nature (2001); Daniel Dennett,
Darwin's Dangerous Idea: Evolution and the Meanings of Life (Simon & Schuster
1995); Helena Cronin, The Ant and the Peacock: Altruism and Sexual Selection from
Darwin to Today (Cambridge 1993); Jerome H. Barkow, Missing the Revolution: Dar-
winism for Social Scientists (Oxford 2005); Randolph M. Nesse & George C. Williams,
Why We Get Sick: The New Science of Darwinian Medicine (Vintage 1996); Wenda R.
Trevathan, et al, Evolutionary Medicine (Oxford 1999).
"I Indeed, the Society for Evolutionary Analysis in Law (S.E.A.L.) now has mem-
bers spanning 32 countries.
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similarities. It would therefore be a mistake to assume that
one should process or react to invocations of behavioral
biology in law in the same way one processes or reacts to
invocations of economics in law.
3) On the other hand, because the two subfields employ very
similar tools, law and behavioral biology scholars should
strive for better engagement with the law and economics
literature, and vice versa. For example, both may benefit
from attending conferences of the other, and from investing
in basic training.
4) As with the law and economics literature, it would be a mis-
take to assume that analysts applying behavioral biology
share a common purpose, a common (or any) political
agenda, common methods, or common views on implica-
tions. Scholars exploring the possible uses of behavioral
biology in law do so for a wide variety of different reasons,
and come to this particular interdisciplinary intersection
with diverse backgrounds, perspectives, and purposes. As
is always the case, different people have different opinions
about the implications or non-implications of biology to
issues that matter to law. Those of us interested in the
biology of behavior are diverse in views. The works of each
scholar should be evaluated independently.
5) There is nothing inherently political about behavioral
biology. 16 As has by now often been said in this context,
explanation is not justification, and description is not pre-
scription. There is no way to reach a normative conclusion
from processes or facts of biology without incorporating
other values.
6) Nevertheless, it is probably safe to assume that some number
of conservative scholars will-intentionally or otherwise-
deploy arguments invoking behavioral biology in further-
ance of various conservative agendas. ' Readers should (as
with all scholarship) approach law and biology scholarship
with a balance of skepticism and open-mindedness.
7) At the same time, the wide variety of scholars who have
'16 For more on this point, see Jones & Goldsmith, at Part V (cited in note 4) (explain-
ing why behavioral biology cannot legitimately be used to support political positions,
including racism, sexism, social Darwinism (more properly "Social Spencerism"),
eugenics, and the like).
"I Some readers will, for example, assume that works such as the following could
play into the hands of conservatives: Kingsley Browne, Sex and Temperament in
Modern Society: A Darwinian View of the Glass Ceiling and the Gender Gap, 37 Ariz
L Rev 971 (1995).
138 Economics, Behavioral Biology, and Law
written evolutionary analyses in law include those from
across the political spectrum, from those who would self-
identify as conservatives to those who self-identify as liber-
als, feminists, or the like. So it is probably also safe to assume
that some number of liberal scholars will-intentionally or
otherwise-deploy arguments invoking behavioral biology
in furtherance of various liberal agendas." 8 Again, both
skepticism and open-mindedness are appropriate.
8) There is a long history, to which we should closely attend,
of biology being misused in furtherance of agendas incon-
sistent with legal equality between the sexes. It is entirely
appropriate that this give us pause. But, to be clear, this
recommends skepticism, rather than antagonism or reflex-
ive rejection. For even if the differences between sexes that
recur in biology make misuse a recurring problem, this is
a situation in which the best defense to misuse is a deeper
knowledge about, and continuing inquiry into, the effects
of evolutionary processes on behavior generally, and the
crucial interplay of genetic and environmental influences,
specifically. In any event, the risks of harms from misuse
should, if possible, be weighed on a case-by-case basis
against the risks of forgone benefits from nonuse.
9) As was true for law and economics scholars, those schol-
ars new to law and behavioral biology should take care to
engage the primary literature on the topic, not just popular
accounts, in efforts to avoid mistakes of over-simplification.
It will often be useful to co-author or to vet manuscripts
with biologists, evolutionists, and others with relevant
training.
10) It is essential to understand behavioral biology if one is to
critique it. Although this requires an investment in time,
the fundamentals of the discipline are accessible to those
willing to study it. Too often, critics who might have offered
something constructive miss their mark by assuming to be
true things (about behavioral biology, or the views of schol-
ars mining it) that are not.
11) The influences of biological processes on human behavior
are frequently controversial, frequently misunderstood,
frequently misdescribed, and sometimes misapplied. This
11 Some readers will, for example, assume that works such as the following could
play into the hands of liberals: Katherine K. Baker, Biology for Feminists, 75 Chi-Kent
L Rev 85 (2000).
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is, perhaps, inevitable. For one thing, the social sciences
and the life sciences have proceeded on separate disciplin-
ary tracks for generations. For another, although the influ-
ences of biological processes are increasingly understood, it
is unlikely that they will ever be perfectly understood. After
all, there are profound complexities inherent to a discipline
that deals in genetically and developmentally unique organ-
isms (in contrast to the case in physics, for example). Add in
the challenges of trying to use insights from any technical
discipline in an area as subtle as law-particularly one that
has sometimes been misused in the past-and discussions
quickly get complicated.
12) Those interested in law and behavior may find it useful to
stay informed of developments in the area. A good way to do
this is to join S.E.A.L.-the Society for Evolutionary Anal-
ysis in Law (www.sealsite.org). Not only does the organiza-
tion help distribute information about recent scholarship,
it also hosts annual scholarship conferences at which to
present and discuss ideas.
13) When generating research ideas, law and behavioral biology
scholars should strive for consilience"19 by weaving together
insights from biology and economics that come from their
common tools. Not only is consilience an important end in
itself, for the increased usefulness that decreased inconsis-
tencies can bring, but this exercise can also frame behav-
ioral biology discussions more accessibly for readers.
14) While there are numerous overlaps between economics
and biology, behavioral biology has much to contribute
on its own terms. Scholars should identify those places
where behavioral biology adds insights that economics
failed to identify. Research ideas might include (but are by
no means limited to) insights into preferences and insights
into so-called "sticky" (change-resistant) behaviors, in par-
ticular those often evident in the contexts of family law,
sexuality and reproduction, and criminal law.
15) As law and economics scholars recognized, an understanding
of tradeoffs, including opportunity costs, is important. Any
comprehensive theory of human behavior must acknowl-
"9 As described by E.O. Wilson, who revived this under-used term, consilience
is "the linking of fact and fact-based theory across disciplines to create a common
groundwork of explanation." Edward 0. Wilson, Consilience: The Unity of Knowl-
edge 8 (Knopf 1998).
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edge and incorporate competing conceptual ideas. In eco-
nomics, for example, actors face a tradeoff between their
preferences for consumption and leisure, and, as a result
of that tradeoff, most humans engage in some but limited
leisure. In the context of behavioral biology, evolutionary
predispositions lend insights into human behavior, but so
does the amazing plasticity of the brain (and the behavioral
plasticity it is capable of generating). Similarly, although
it might be useful to model humans as agents striving to
maximize both their inclusive fitness and their material
resources, they also ultimately confront tradeoffs between
the two. Moreover, the attainment of either is sometimes
subject to constraints generated by a need to survive within
one's social group (i.e., avoid ostracism). Much interesting
work can be generated by exploring these tradeoffs, and
their implications for legal policy.
16) Law and behavioral biology should avoid the imperialistic
aspirations that plagued some early law and economics
scholars. No one field possesses a monopoly on valuable
insights regarding human behavior. Instead, important
insights into behavior often result from combining insights
from multiple fields (as Darwin, Friedman, Alchian, Triv-
ers, and Maynard Smith did).
17) Similarly, law and behavioral biology scholars should avoid
overclaiming the extent to which its tools are useful to law.
No field can answer all questions of legal policy, and the
success of the discipline could turn on avoiding the implau-
sible and, ideally, beginning with clear applications.
18) Finally, because the low-hanging fruit in law and economics
has all been plucked, there are significant opportunities in
law and behavioral biology with potentially greater returns
for scholars already familiar with law and economics. There
are enormously expansive territories in law and behavioral
biology that remain unexplored, with the consequence that
law and behavioral biology is growing and accelerating.
The extent of useful work yet to be done vastly exceeds
the work that already has been done. There are opportuni-
ties, here, for people with the commitment and interest to
explore entire subfields of law (such as torts, family law,
and criminal law) through the lens of behavioral biology.
Along the way, scholars in law and behavioral biology can
borrow from the economic methodologies that already have
been translated into the legal literature. In tackling law and
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behavioral biology, the law and economics scholars there-
fore will often enjoy a competitive advantage.
VI. CONCLUSION
This article has provided a very brief overview of the similarities
and differences between economics and behavioral biology, as well
as between the related intersections of law and economics on one
hand, and law and behavioral biology on the other. To the question
with which we opened (might law and biology be the next law and
economics?) we offer an unequivocal yes and no. We have identified
important overlaps, as well as important differences-both in the
substance of the disciplines themselves and also in the pathways for
incorporation into legal thinking.
We believe that the overlaps between economics and biology
warrant even greater congress between these two disciplines, and
expanded exchange between the legal thinkers interested in each of
them. We also believe that the differences between economics and
biology warrant individualized attention to each, particularly to
the comparatively under-explored ways in which the influence of
biological processes on human brains and behaviors are relevant to
achieving, as efficiently and effectively as feasible, the goals society
assigns to law.

